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Ukraine. Another view
Ukraine is a difficult partner for the West, and re c e n t l y, it has been per-
ceived as an enfant terrible because of the Kolchuga affair. We s t e r n
and Polish press describe Ukraine as an authoritarian regime plagued
by an internal crisis or even threatened by destabilisation. This picture
is certainly one-sided and oversimplified, and it fails to accurately pre-
sent the reality of Ukraine. Apart from experiencing definitely adverse
political developments, Ukraine has also been successful in some ways
in terms of its internal and foreign policies and the economy. At the
same time, certain processes take place among the Ukrainian elites,
that might be difficult to capture in social surveys, but may become
the starting point for the future modernisation and democratisation
of the country.
To realise that there are some favourable aspects to the changes occur-
r i n g in Ukraine is not to recognise Ukraine as a country heading to 
democratisation and a market economy in the Western sense. Still, it
is worthwhile to understand that the positive developments, even if
isolated, do occur in Ukraine and that they could be strengthened by
adequate policies of the Ukrainian authorities and the Western states.
I. Positive Developments
The promising developments that take place in Ukraine include an incre-
ase of civic mindedness in some communities and professional groups.
A l s o, young people are definitely more pro- West and pro- m a r ket economy
oriented than the older generation. Politically, the most important occur-
rences that are favourable from the point of view of the West include
UkraineÕs dynamically developing co-operation with NATO and its co-
operation with Russia, which is now based on much more pragmatic
principles than it used to be in the past.
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In Search of a Civilised Policy
The oligarchic and bureaucratic system that had formed in Ukraine inte-
grates political, economic and media powers into anetwork of partly-co-
vert relations. Undoubtedly, this distances Ukraine from the democratic
systems of the West. It also impedes the development of processes and
attitudes that could be conducive to UkraineÕs transformation into a de-
mocratic state governed by the rule of law, with a viable market e c o n o-
m y. At the same time, however, the present system is capable of ensuring
stability for the country, which is valuable in moments of political c r i s e s
and changes at the heights of power. The stability is even more valuable
given the multi-ethnic and multi-religion character of the state. It should
be remembered that since Ukraine regained independence in 1991, the
succession of executive or legislative power taking place on the occasions
of elections has always been peaceful and got the recognition of the 
international community. Likewise, the emerging ethnic or religious con-
flicts (in Crimea) have always been solved by mutual concessions and 
never led to the use of military force.
Even though the oligarchic and bureaucratic system, pervasive on all le-
vels of the stateÕs structure, is firmly in place, Ukraine undergoes proces-
ses that may become the basis for future democratisation and moderni-
sation of the country.
Sociological research carried out in 1999Ð2002 shows that young people
(18-35) have definitely more pro-West and pro-market economy attitudes
than the older generation. Young people generally support UkraineÕs mem-
bership in the EU and NATO and declare backing for the implementation
of economic reforms. At the same time, they are more acutely critical of
the adverse phenomena such as political censorship in the media. Pro-
bably, one of the reasons why such attitudes developed was the fact that
in early 90s, it became possible for Ukrainians to travel abroad. As a re s u l t ,
contacts between the societies of Ukraine and the Western countries (in-
cluding Poland) intensified. In the recent years, the rate of foreign travel
increased dynamically.
It also appears that rising awareness of civic identity made some groups
in the Ukrainian society willing to become more politically and socially
active and to defend the fundamental values. The case of the journalist
Georgi Gongadze not only galvanised the intelligentsia, but also made
a portion of the society realise that there are pathologies in the system
of power and that it is necessary to civilise the political life. Ukrainians
e x p ressed this attitude in the parliamentary elections of 2002 where more
than half of the voters refused to vote for the so called party of power
and more than 20 per cent of them supported the political project which
aimed to repair the state based on the principles of justice, honesty and
freedom (proposed by the ÒOur UkraineÓ electoral block). It was only due
to the mixed electoral regulations that the ruling coalition finally won
a substantial representation in the parliament.
In the recent months, we have been witnessing the birth of the journa-
lists communityÕs initiative to defend freedom of speech and to end po-
litical censorship in the media. As a result of this initiative, an indepen-
dent trade union on journalists is to be established in early 2003. But to-
day, it is difficult to say how effective this action will be in safeguarding
respect for freedom of speech.
Finally, there is the non-governmental organisations sector. In the begin-
ning of the previous decade, they would mainly implement foreign mo-
dels, but now, to a growing extent, their activities are based on proprie-
tary programs developed locally to meet the specific needs of local com-
munities.
Economy Goes Up
Ukraine have managed to maintain strong economic growth rate for thre e
consecutive years (6% in 2000, 9% in 2001 and around 4% in 2002). At
first, growth was stimulated by a good external conditions (exports of the
heavy industryÕ s p roducts to Russia and other countries), and more re c e n-
t l y, by increasing domestic demand emerged as growth driver. 
Noteworthy is the recent dynamic development of the foods and other
consumer goods industries. The investment volumes increased substan-
tially (especially in 2001). In part, this increase was generated by Ukra-
inian and Russian capitals withdrawn from tax heavens, while the influx
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of foreign investments that could bring new technologies remained very
l o w. Finally, the Ukrainian economy has become less energ y - i n t e n s i v e .
As a result of the reforms, barters in settlements of natural gas and elec-
tricity dues were abandoned. Consequently, the budgetary conditions
improved enabling the state to timely pay salaries and pensions. 
It appears that in spite of certain impending problems, the Ukrainian eco-
nomy is capable of developing slowly in the next few years, owing to the
expanding of internal markets, among other factors. However, it should
be noted that growth dynamics has been waning since 2001, and in or-
der to stimulate it, the authorities would need to carry out deep re f o r m s .
More Pragmatic Relations with Russia 
The Ukrainian Ð Russian relations have been changing for the better sin-
ce the pragmatic turn in the KremlinÕs policy, which coincided with the
announcement of minister ZlenkoÕs doctrine that granted Russia the sta-
tus of UkraineÕs main strategic partner (2000). Russia no longer treats
Ukraine as a Òseasonal stateÓ, rather, it sees it as MoscowÕs weaker part-
ner. Moscow seems to realise that it has a limited capacity of influencing
political decisions of Ky i v. As an example, when Kyiv repeatedly refuses to
join the Russia-dominated Euro Asian Economic Community, the Kre m l i n
refraines from responding officially.
As far as the economy is concerned, Russia carries its strategic interests
in Ukraine by taking over shares in key establishments of the energy,
fuels, petrochemical, telecommunications and banking sectors. A telling
example of how effectual these efforts are is KyivÕs concession made to
Russia with regard to the formation of a joint Russian Ð Ukrainian con-
sortium to manage the system of UkraineÕs gas pipelines (the pre-inve-
stment stage is to be completed by August 2003). The fact that the West
actually isolates Ukraine appears to be particularly conducive to the re-
inforcement of RussiaÕs economic influence in Ukraine. 
However, the pursuit of its interests by Russia does not destabilise the
economic situation of Ukraine. On the one hand, the Russian capital con-
tributes to UkraineÕs economic growth, and on the other, the Ukrainian
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business elites (the oligarchs) are more and more interested in co-opera-
ting with the Russians in a way that will enable them to keep or streng-
then their influence on the economic sectors that they control.
Exceptional Co-operation with NATO
Over the last two years, Ukraine became one of NATOÕs most active part-
ners, and it outdid some of the AllianceÕs official candidates in terms of
the area and scale of joint undertakings. The Armed Forces of Ukraine
opened to NATO in an unprecedented manner and they became the pri-
mary area of UkraineÕs co-operation with the West. Ukraine agreed to
make the basic data on the structure and capabilities of its army availa-
ble to NATO. The program for reform and development of the Armed For-
ces is being implemented in strict co-operation with the Alliance and it
aims to adapt the Armed Forces to NATO standards.
With UkraineÕs involvement in NATO operations in the Balkans, the coun-
t ry was able to make its co-operation with the Alliance exceptionally clo-
se, outdoing all other partner states. The Ukrainian soldiers were the
first non-NATO troops to join a military structure operating under NATO
standards in an organised form, i.e. as part of the joint Polish Ð Ukra-
inian battalion.
Even the problem of weapons sold by Ukraine to embargoed states, which
is an extremely sensitive issue in the AllianceÕs relations with Ukraine,
did not prevent the mutual relations from being elevated to a higher le-
vel: during the Prague summit in November 2002 the Action Plan was
adopted, which is a limited version of the Membership Action Plan. The
Action Plan differs from the Membership Action Plan in that it does not
envisage prospects of membership, but nevertheless, UkraineÕs strategic
choice seems to be what the secretary of the National Security and De-
fence Council stated in his official declaration issued in May 2002, name-
ly to take efforts for UkraineÕs future membership in the Alliance. 
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European Union Ð the Choice of the Elites 
and Young People
Since 1998, President Kuchma has been officially maintaining that inte-
gration with the EU remains among UkraineÕs objectives. This political
project appears to be implemented somewhat inconsistently, but never-
theless, it influences the way the elites think and stimulates some chan-
ges to the functioning of the state. At the same time, it appears to be an
element in UkraineÕs strategy of non-participation in any structures 
dominated by Russia. Units responsible for European integration have
been operating within particular ministries for several years. In the 
Ministry of Economy and European Integration there is a large team that
deals with harmonisation of the Ukrainian legislation and the EU legisla-
tion, among other issues. Even though Brussels refuses to give an affir-
mative answer to KyivÕs European aspirations, the European Union is 
very popular with the Ukrainians. According to surveys, 56 per cent of
respondents support integration with the EU, with even stronger bac-
king for this plan declared by younger generations: between 64 per cent
(for the 25-39 age bracket) and 68 per cent (for the 18-24 age bracket).1
II. Adverse Developments. Threats
The promising and favourable developments in the political, economic
and social life of Ukraine should not avert oneÕs attention from the series
of unsettling trends and issues that the Ukrainian state has to face. They
relate to the fundamental pathologies of social, political and economic
life in a post-communist state for which transformation into a democra-
cy and a market economy, as undertaken by the Central European states,
proved more difficult, or even impossible for diverse reasons.
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1 This re s e a rch was carried out in 2000 by SOCIS Gallup for the Institute of Public Af f a i r s .
The Succession of Power
The most prominent issue faced by Ukraine in the recent months is the
struggle for power that goes on as part of the informally initiated cam-
paign for the presidential elections of 2004. It is especially unsettling
that the problem of the succession of power has dominated the main
stream of UkraineÕs political life and overshadowed the issues of reform
and state modernisation, which, undoubtedly, are more important from
the point of view of the 48-million society. The sides that battle for po-
wer ever more fiercely include the three major oligarchic clans: the Don-
tetsk clan, the Kyiv clan and the Dnepropetrovsk clan, as well as the le-
ader of Our Ukraine, Viktor Yuschenko. In this situation, the year 2003 is
sure to bring about certain populist moves on the part of the authorities,
which will aim to put the electorate in a better mood, but may shake the
balance of the stateÕs budget.
Corruption
The bureaucratic and oligarchic system that functions in Ukraine causes
other disturbing occurrences such as widespread corruption and politi-
cal censorship in the media. Ukraine occupies top positions in interna-
tional rankings that represent the degrees of corruption in particular
states. This, combined with a business-unfriendly legislation, is the ma-
in factor that keeps foreign investors away. Ukraine is also frequently cri-
ticised by the international community (e.g. recently, by the Council of
Europe) for failing to respect freedom of the media. Because of the uni-
que intertwining of political and economic powers and their influence
on the respective media, we cannot actually speak of any independent
media or freedom of opinion for journalists in Ukraine. Journalists wor-
king for the Ukrainian media are forced to take into account suggestions
of the owners and topic instructions issued by the PresidentÕs Admini-
stration in their daily work. In the recent months, ever since Viktor Me-
dvedchuk became head of the PresidentÕs Administration, pressure on
the media increased substantially.
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Sale of Weapons
Another particularly disturbing issue that troubles the relations between
Ukraine and the West is the recently disclosed instances of UkraineÕs s a l e
of arms to embargoed states (Macedonia) and suspected sale of arms to
Iraq (the so called Kolchuga affair). In Ukraine, the state fails to effecti-
vely control the sale of weapons and there are no clear rules to govern
weapons trade. This has an adverse effect on UkraineÕs international
image, even though similar charges could formulated against nearly all
of UkraineÕs neighbours from the former USSR.
Absence of structural reforms 
The prospects for UkraineÕs stable development are uncertain. It has not
implemented structural reforms and neither has it completed the priva-
tisation process. As a result, it is unpre p a red to compete with the EUÕs eco-
nomy and the legalisation of its business elites is delayed. The prematu-
re electoral campaign has disturbed the parliamentÕs legislative work.
There is no progress in the works (which have went on for two years
now) on a package of legislative projects developed with the co-opera-
tion of foreign experts, which relate to such key issues as the tax code,
the stock exchange law, or the code of commerce.
III. Re c o m m e n d a t i o n s
1. The EU and Polish policies towards Ukraine need to be based on ba-
lanced analyses of the situation and thorough understanding of both the
adverse and the positive factors. 
Since the opinions expressed recently have been predominantly negative,
it should be suggested that more attention be paid to long-term positi-
ve developments such as an increase in the societyÕs political awareness
and activity, favourable trends in the economy, more pragmatic relations
with the Russian Federation or more in-depth co-operation with NATO.
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2. Strong and wise support for the UkraineÕs Òdemocratisation potentialÓ
should remain the major objective of Western policies toward Ukraine.
The Òdemocratisation potentialÓ is to be understood as all the processes
that may become the starting point for further democratisation and mo-
dernisation of the country. These processes include the growth of civil
awareness among some social groups and the firmly pro-Western attitu-
des of the young generation. It seems that these processes are far more
advanced in Ukraine than in most of the other CIS countries, including
the neighbouring Russia, let alone Belarus. In order to prepare the gro-
und for this kind of policy, the EU could carry out a broad-scale informa-
tion campaign on the European Union in Ukraine.
3. Poland could play its role as a go-between for the Western elites and
the broadly understood Ukrainian elites, including the cultural, political
and business communities, more proactively. It appears desirable to ar-
range bilateral Polish Ð Ukrainian meetings in which EU representatives
would participate and to invite observers from Ukraine to Polish Ð EU
meetings.
4. As Ukraine faces the failure of its plans to integrate with the West (the
EU refuses to make a clear declaration and NATO gives no answer to
UkraineÕs desire to become a member of the Alliance) and the growing
syndrome of being left overboard of the uniting Europe, it is particular-
ly important for Brussels to offer Kyiv a realistic alternative political pro-
ject that would meet UkraineÕs ambitions at least in part. By clearly de-
fining the requirements that Kyiv needs to meet and the concessions
that the EU will make if Kyiv complies, Brussels could found the frame-
work for the future more in-depth co-operation. In the course of Ukra-
ineÕs co-operation with NATO so far, Kyiv has demonstrated that if the
requirements to be met and the benefits to be earned are clearly stated,
it is willing and able to make effective efforts to adapt to Western stan-
dards. This should encourage the EU to make such an offer. There is an
extremely important potential role for Poland to play in the develop-
P O L I C Y B R I E F S
2 3
ment and carrying of such a stand on the part of the Community. A gre-
at majority of the other EU states have no vital interests in Ukraine and
they are not concerned about what happens there. 
5. When formulating the assumptions of the WestÕs policy towards Kyiv,
it is of crucial importance to understand that the dynamics of positive
changes in Ukraine is much weaker than in the future EU member sta-
tes from Central Europe. Due to the size of the country, the burden of the
institutional and mental structures inherited from the times of the So-
viet Union, and finally, weakness of the executive and the legislative au-
thority, Ukraine will take much more time to implement the projected re-
forms than smaller countries that were less affected by the communist
legacy. Therefore, the WestÕs policy towards Ukraine should be long-
term-oriented.
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